The Problem of Mind-Body Dichotomy: A Critique of the Cartesian Approach by Mendie, John Gabriel & Udofia, Stephen Nwanaokuo
                            GNOSI: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Human Theory and Praxis, Vol. 1(2) (2018)
(DOI: https://doi.org/10.5281/10.5281/zenodo.3463785)
O R I G I N A L A R T I C L E
The Problem of Mind-Body Dichotomy: A Critique of the Cartesian
Approach
 John Gabriel Mendie | Udofia, Stephen Nwanaokuo
1P.hD Candidate, Department of Philosophy, University of Calabar, Cross River State.
2 Department of Philosophy, University Of Ibadan, Ibadan, Nigeria.
Abstract:  The mind-body problem is  a  perennial  philosophical  problem that  seeks to  uncover the
relationship or causal interaction that exists between the corporeal and incorporeal aspects of the human
person. It thrives under the assumption that the human person is made up of two distinct entities, that is,
mind and body, which explains their assumed causal relation. As attractive as this may seem, not all
philosophers  agree  to  this  feigned  idea  of  interaction  and  bifurcation  of  the  human  person.  One
philosopher of note, who sorts to address this problem in the 17th century, is René Descartes.  For
Descartes,  minds  and  bodies  are  distinct  kinds  of  substance,  where  bodies  are  spatially  extended
substances (a res extensa) and minds are unexpended substances characterised primarily by thought (a
res cogitans). But, if minds and bodies are radically dissimilar, how could they causally interact? This
paper  therefore  attempts  to  examine  the  philosophical  foundations  of  Cartesian  dualism.  It  also
articulates the major arguments adopted by Descartes through his methodic doubts to address the mind-
body  problem.  The  paper  concludes  by  highlighting  some  fundamental  criticisms  of  Cartesian
Interactionism in the light of recent trends in parapsychology and neuro-scientific research.
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 INTRODUCTION
Rene Descartes (1596-1650), the French born mathematician turned philosopher, was
chiefly  concerned  with  the  disharmony  that  pervaded  the  house  of  philosophy.  This
disharmony, to him, unlike in the exact sciences of physics, geometry and mathematics (his
original  background),  gave  audience  to  skepticism  to  hold  sway  over  every  position
philosophers had hitherto advanced even before his arrival to the scenery of philosophical
discourse. Descartes’ diagnosis of the skeptical challenge was that the skeptical confront was
apparently unassailable, because prior philosophies had been anchored on shaky foundations.
If this is the case, it should follow, for Descartes that if a solid foundation can be found upon
which an epistemological edifice can be erected, then the arguments of the skeptics will no
longer hold any water. Upon critical reflections, and having employed the methodic doubt as
his  intrumentum  laborat  (working  tool)  Descartes  concluded  that  what  this  indubitable
foundation upon which a philosophy immune from skepticism can be built on, is the ego or
mind. Thus, the fact that one is involved in a process of doubt, cannot be logically doubted.
The certainty of the doubting and the doubter is, therefore, self-evident. The mind which is
effecting  this  self-evident  activity  and  all  beliefs  emanating  from it,  therefore,  becomes
apodictic and self-evidently justified.iFrom the indubitability of the subsistence of the mind,
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Descartes was able, in a manner akin to the mathematical sciences, to deduce the existence of
the physical world which he believes interact with the mentalistic world of the mind. It is this
aspect of the Cartesian philosophical project of mind-body interaction that this paper seeks to
appraise. Before cutting into the chase, it will be apposite to commence our discourse with a
brief review of the idea of personhood.
ON THE ONTOLOGY OF THE HUMAN PERSON IN TRADITIONAL (WESTERN)
PHILOSOPHY
Ontology, or the study of being qua being, is the aspect of metaphysics that critically
reflects on that which exists in reality. The word ontology is used to refer to philosophical
investigation of existence, or being. Such investigation may be directed towards the concept
of  being,  asking what  ‘being’ means or  what  it  is  for  something to  exist;  it  may also be
concerned with the question ‘what exists?’, or ‘what general sort of things are there?’ It is
common to speak of a philosopher’s ontology, meaning the kind of thing they take to exist, or
the ontology of a theory, that is, the things that would have to exist for that theory to be true. ii
With respect to the ‘human person’, philosophers have been concerned about putting rational
arguments  forward  in  support  of  their  respective  views  to  what  really constitutes  human
nature, as opposed to illusions and myths. These concerted efforts have yielded some relevant
ontological questions such as: What is a ‘person’ made up of? Is a person a physico-chemical
entity amenable to pure scientific analysis? Isa person a purely spiritual or physical entity, or a
union of both spiritual and physical substances? A plethora of answers have been put forward
by philosophers down the ages and across cultures to attempt these questions.
Plato, for instance, argues for a dualistic understanding of human nature. For him, a
person is made up of soul and body. The soul is in the body not like form in matter, but as a
mover in a mobile body. The soul is to the body what a captain is to a ship, that is, the captain
governs the ship, but the captain is a being that is ontologically distinct from the ship and can
exist when not on the ship. Hence, Plato was an uncompromising spiritualist for he reduced
human nature to a purely spiritual entity.iiiThis explains why he had often been charged with
the  error  of  existence for  relegating  and  excluding  matter  from  the  economy  of
existence.Aristotle  argues  for  a  rather  complementary  position  by positing  that,  although
human nature is made up of a subsisting soul (form) and a corruptible body (matter), the soul
is the life-giving principle (primum principiumvitae) of the body and the body is the principle
of  individuation  through  which  the  soul  achieves  its  basic  function  of  intellection.  Both
components  are  substantially  and  hypostatically  united  to  make  up  a  person. ivThomas
Aquinas, borrowing from Aristotle, also argues for a hylemorphic understanding of the human
person. In his view, a person is substantially a union of soul (μορφή) and body (υλή), which
though distinct are not separate.v
On his part,  David Hume believes thatspiritual and material substances are evenly
inconceivable. His idea of personhood or human nature is summed up in his  bundle theory,
which states that,  the mind is  nothing but  a bundle or collection of different  perceptions,
which  succeed  each  other  in  an  inconceivable  rapidity,  and  are  in  perpetual  flux  and
movement.vi Thus, the human person is  ipso facto  nothing but a bundle of perceptions. In
contemporary time, a laboratory analysis of a person’s anatomy will only reveal that a person
is nothing other than a physico-chemical entity. If this is the case, how come our ordinary
language  seems  to endorse  a  contrary view that  there  is  something  else  –  fundamentally
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different  from physico-chemical  properties – that  make us up, say spirit,  mind, an ego or
conscious-self  that  is  not  amenable  to  scientific  and  laboratory  analysis?  This  ordinary
language  refutation  of  the  position  that  we  are  merely  physico-chemical  entities  is  also
endorsed by religion with its attendant teachings of ‘after-life’, God, angels, and so on. The
physico-chemical  ontology of  the  human person,  among many other  criticisms,  seems  to
imply that a human person is no different from other physical entities in nature and hence is
amenable  to  the  mechanical  laws  of  nature.  If  man  is  amenable  to  the  mechanistic  and,
consequently, ‘deterministic’ laws of nature, then there is no ‘freewill’ basis for his or her
moral  actions and choices.  Other  objections against  the physico-chemical  ontology of the
human person is  that  of  the  data of  phenomena like  ‘Extra  Sensory Perception’,  ‘magic’,
‘Psycho-kinesis’, ‘Telepathy’, ‘Witchcraft’, and so on, that have been suggested by scholars
and researchers like Albert Mosleyvii and Sophie Oluwole,viii among a host of many others. In
light of the preceding, if it is true that these phenomena subsist then the human person is not
only a physico-chemical entity.
Before we conclude our discussion in this part of the essay, it is crucial to note that
“the  view  that  the  human  person  is  essentially  a  physico-chemical  entity  (with  diverse
formulations) is a version of  materialistic monism. Another version of such formulations is
that of idealistic monism. This latter view of personhood holds that man, essentially, is only a
spiritual entity. We need not rehearse the difficulty in maintaining a view like this, since it
apparently denies that we have no physical bodies – and by extension the corporeal world is
unreal. Interestingly, one may ask, where René Descartes fits into all these, taking to mind his
bent towards a dualistic ontology. In what follows, the paper, attempts this question with a
brief retrieval of the central arguments of Descartes’ontology of the human person.
DESCARTES’ ONTOLOGY OF THE HUMAN PERSON:  A RETRIEVAL OF THE
CENTRAL ARGUMENTS
Without prejudice to the title of this section, let us quickly bear inmind that throughout the
Meditations, Descartes’ primary concern is epistemology, so he never stops tinkering with his
theory  of  knowledge.  As  such,  in  the  final  three  meditations,  he  moves  from  the
epistemological problem of certainty to metaphysical questions about reality. These include
the existence of God, the existence of the physical world, and the mind-body relationship. ixIt
follows  from  the  above  that  the  Cartesian  ontology  of  the  human  person  can  only  be
understood if we first discussed briefly, his theory of knowledge. Descartes, it will be recalled,
had commenced his philosophical career with his disillusionment that there was  no certain
knowledge in the discipline. But as an ‘epistemic optimist’,  he was not merely content to
accept  this  apparent  conclusion.  He  thought  it  will  be  prudent  to  ‘sift’  every  piece  of
‘knowledge’ he had hitherto acquired before he will affirm this pessimistic conclusion that
knowledge was impossible. 
To perform this pretty onerous task of sifting all his former beliefs, Descartes chose to
employ the attitude of the skeptics – those who deny that objective knowledge of reality (in
any guise) is impossible. This attitude has been called, by commentators, the methodic doubt.
While employing this ‘methodic doubt’, Descartes concludes, first, that all his former beliefs
that derive from common sense experience, cannot provide him with certain knowledge on
two  grounds:  one,  sense  experience  often  deceive  us  (optical  illusions,  for
example).According  to  him,  is  it  not  “prudent  never  to  trust  completely those  who  have
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deceived  us  even  once?”x Besides  this,  even  if  we  seem so  sure  of  ourselves  as  being
conscious beings, Descartes is quick to remind us of the sheer resemblance of dream and ‘real
life.’ In light of this fact, he rhetorically queries us again: how do we know for certain that this
so-called present ‘real life’ is not a long dream from which we might one day wake up from?
Second, and lastly, Descartes avers that the seemingly apodictic proofs and conclusions of the
mathematical sciences are not immune from doubt. His justification for this rather startling
supposition is that it is not impossible, logically speaking, to imagine that an evilgenius has
hitherto been feeding us with perpetual phantasmagoria about the ‘truths’ of our mathematical
conclusions. But, are all things then uncertain, Descartes wonders? Descartes’ answer to this
question is, No. To him, even if all things are uncertain, the ‘subject’ behind this ‘doubting’ (or
thinking) must be  real, certain. This ‘I’ or  Ego  that doubts (thinks) must, therefore, exist –
cogito ego sum,  simpliciter! In an apparent reversal of the denial that there was  no certain
belief, Descartes now maintains that there is at least one certain belief – that is, the ‘I’ or ‘Ego’
or  ‘Mind’  which  is  responsible  for  this  self-evident  activity  of  doubting.  To Descartes,
therefore, “even though there may be a deceiver of some sort who bends all his effort to keep
me perpetually deceived, there can be no slightest doubt that I exist.”xi Like the rationalists
before him,  Descartes,  having gotten this indubitable knowledge of the subsistence of his
mind, subsequently erects a knowledge edifice on it. His ‘deduction’ of other apodictic beliefs,
like the physical world and God, from the indubitable subsistence of his mind, simultaneously
represents his position on the ontology of the human person. To this, we now turn our beam in
the subsequent paragraphs. 
What encapsulates Descartes’ ontology primarily is his dualistic view of the human
person. This is clear in his avowal that in him is found an “intelligence” whose nature was
distinct from his body. He writes:
I  find  in  myself  faculties  employing  modes  of  thinking
peculiar  to  themselves,  to  wit,  the  faculties  of  imagination
and feeling, which I can easily conceive myself clearly and
distinctly as a complete being; while, on the other hand, they
cannot  be  so  conceived  apart  from me  that  is,  without  an
intelligent substance in which they reside...I observe also in
me some other faculties such as that of change of position, if
it  be  true  that  they  exist,  they  must  be  attached  to  some
corporeal  or  extended  substance,  and  not  to  an  intelligent
substance. There is certainly further in me a certain passive
faculty of perception, that is, of receiving and recognizing the
ideas  of  sensible  things,  but  this  would  be  useless  to  me
seeing  that  it  does  not  presuppose  thought.  It  is  thus
necessarily  the  case  that  this  faculty  resides  in  some
substance different from me. And this substance is either a
body, that is, a corporeal nature...xii
As expressed above, we can draw a distinction between the body and mind by expounding
their  characteristics  in  the  aforementioned  enunciation.  Body,  for  Descartes  would  be  a
substance characterized primarily by extension; defined by a certain figure; can be confined in
a certain place; can be perceived either by touch, by sight, by hearing, by taste, or by smell;
and  can  be  moved  in  many ways  by  something  foreign  to  it.  While  Mind,  would  be  a
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substance characterised primarily by Thought. With this in mind, it would be sufficient to say
that Descartes considered mind and body as two distinct substances. 
In  view of  this  submission,  three  quintessential  questions  can be raised regarding
Descartes’ ontology:
1. If the body is a material substance or entity with extension as its essential feature, and the
mind is a substance too, with thought as its own essence, then, how can interaction, that is, the
“union” and “intermingling,” between such ontologically different entities occur?  If mind is
unextended and matter is extended, how do they interact?
2. The second question follows directly from the first: where does this interaction take place,
even  if  the  possibility  of  interaction  was  to  be  valid?  3.  A third  question  rests  on  the
supposition of substance as defined by Descartes; where Descartes understood substance to be
“nothing other than anything which exists in such a way as to depend on no other thing for its
existence.”xiii By this definition, can we strictly call mind and body substances contrary to
Descartes’ aboriginal expression?
The notion of mind occupies a conspicuous stead in Descartes’ ontology of the human
person. The mind is a substance in which thought immediately resides. Descartes preferred the
word  mind to  soul on the ground that he saw the latter as not only ambiguous but as often
applied to something corporeal.xiv The mind however is a thing that thinks; an intelligence,
intellect or reason. It is also the “first actuality” or “the principal form of man” which must be
understood to apply only in virtue of which we think. Although Descartes demeans the word
soul, we still see an interchangeable use of it in reference to the intrinsic principle of thought
in the human being (mind). Apart from thoughts, nothing else can be attributed to the soul.
There are two principal kinds of thought: actions of the soul on one hand, and its passions, on
the other. Of the first kind, Descartes calls volitions, considering that we experience them as
proceeding  directly  from our  soul  and  as  seeming  to  depend  on  it  alone.  The  passions
constitute those various perceptions or modes of knowledge present in us. They are called
passions judging from the view that it is often not our souls that make them as they are, but in
turn receives them from the things that are represented by them. xv A further division of the
volition gives us the first part, those which consist of the actions of the soul which terminate
in the soul itself, while the other consists in those actions which terminate in the body, as in
locomotion.xvi
In Descartes, there is the power of the soul with respect to the body and the power of
the soul, with respect to its passions. The former, within the limits of volition is strictly within
the  power  of  the  soul,  and  can  only  be  changed  indirectly  by  the  body.  The  latter  are
absolutely dependent on the actions which produce them, and can be changed by the soul only
indirectly, except when it is itself the cause.xvii Descartes goes further to distinguish between
two faculties or principal properties of the soul, namely: the perception of the intellect (the act
of sensory perception, imagination and pure understanding) and the determination of the will
(desire, aversion, assertion, denial and doubt).xviii In his argument for immortality of the soul,
Descartes maintains that since the mind is distinct from the body, and since the human soul is
in  its  nature  per  se entirely  independent  of  the  body,  it  is  consequently  immortal  and
incorruptible.xix
Rebuffing the arguments of some ancient philosophers about the plurality of souls in
human beings, Descartes argues that there is only one soul in human beings, the rational soul;
for no action can be reckoned human, unless they depend on  reason. The vegetative power
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and the power of moving the body, which are called the vegetative and sensory souls in plants
and animals, exist also in human beings; but in the case of human beings, they should not be
called souls because they are not the first principle of their actions, and they belong to a totally
different genus from the rational soul.xxWith this argument in mind, Descartes affirms that the
essence of man is mind (thoughts). He writes: “I knew nothing clearly as belonging to my
essence excepting that I know no other thing which pertains to my essence.  I do not admit in
myself anything but mind, therefore, I am a thing that thinks or a thing that has in itself the
faculty of thinking.”xxi Descartes’ distrust therefore covers everything, including his own body,
an entirely different substance. Since he has already defined that he is, a thinking thing, he
therefore finds it necessary to reject other aspects of his perceived existence to add up to his
thesis:  Cogito ergo sum (I think,  therefore, I am).  From the foregoing,  it  is clear that the
essence of man for Descartes is mind; this indicates a systematic rejection of the body and its
attributes  in  the  philosophical  corpus of  Descartes.  Descartes  further  writes,  “of  these
things(the body and its attributes), I found none of which I can say that it pertains to me. I am,
I exist, that is certain. If I ceased entirely to think, I should likewise cease altogether to exist,
hence to speak accurately, I am not more than a thing which thinks, that is to say a mind or a
soul or an understanding or a reason. I am however a real thing and really exist; a thing that
thinks.”xxiiThis implies that all those that relate to the nature of body are nothing but dreams
(and chimeras) and there is no argument for him, which the existence of the body can be
necessarily deduced. 
Having espoused the nature of the mind, the essence of man, the place of matter and
other  related  themes  in  his  ontology,  the  onus  was  on  Descartes  to  explain  the  causal
relationship or interaction of mind and body. To this,  he writes:  “I  contented myself  with
supposing that God formed the body of man altogether like ours, in the outward figure of its
members as well as in the interior conformation of its organs, without making use of any
matter  other than that  which I  had described...(therefore)  God created a rational  soul  and
united it to the body in a particular manner.”xxiiiThis union or interaction takes place in what
Descartes  calls  the  seat  of  interaction:  the  pineal  gland.  This  gland  corresponds  to  his
description of the existence of, a small gland in the brain where the soul exercises its functions
more particularly than in the other parts of the body. What influenced Descartes’ choice was
his convictions via observation, that all the other parts of our brain, except the pineal gland,
are double, as also are all the other organs of our external sense.xxiv We can easily understand
that images or other impressions are unified in this gland by means of the animal spirits xxv
which fill the cavities of the brain. But they cannot exist in this way in any other place in the
body, except as a result of being in its gland.
As  seen  ex  post  facto,  despite  the  separate,  irreducible,  subsistence  of  mind  and  body,
Descartes believes that they causally affect or causally  interact with each other. The mind
wills to sing and the mouth necessarily carries out the order. Similarly, the body, say nostrils,
perceives the aroma of scrambled eggs and bread, and the mind starts to feel hungry, and so
on. Essentially, “my mind is capable of putting my body into motion and vice versa.”xxvi The
obvious consequence of this position, which Descartes himself saw, is to ask exactly how an
unextended, non-physical, mind can ‘affect’ (or ‘interact’ with) an extended, physical, body.
And  granted  that  they interact,  exactly  where is  the  location  of  this  alleged  interaction?
Descartes’ answer that the pineal gland, which is located at the base of the brain (effectively
explains this  how and  where questions of interaction) – provokes further problems. Let us
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suspend our critique of the Cartesian thesis of mind-body interaction till the next section of
our discourse. In the interim, suffice it to say that the rationale behind Descartes’ position on
the of the human person is his background as a  persona of faith (religion) and science. His
catholic background privileges the doctrines of ‘after-life’ and freedom of the will, while his
scientific  background thrives  on the assumption that  all  inanimate  objects  in  the  physical
world (including man’s body) follow a deterministic course. It was in a bid to reconcile these
counter theses, which he found quite persuasive, that Descartes advanced his interactionist
thesis of mind-body relationship.
THE  CARTESIAN  PROJECT  OF  MIND-BODY  INTERACTION:  A  CRITICAL
ANALYSIS
The principal  merit  that  can be adduced in favor  of the Cartesian interactionist  theory of
psycho-physical  dualism  which  our  former  analysis  seems  to  have  thrown  up  is  that  it
preserves the notion of ‘freewill (volition)’ upon which the twin worlds of ethical theorizing
and religious beliefs are founded. It also presents supplementary knowledge on the ontological
status of the mind and its functional attributes. Beyond this, however, the theory throws up a
plethora of insuperable difficulties. As earlier intimated, Descartes’ position that mind-body
interaction takes place in the ‘pineal gland’ is problematic. It is asked: is the pineal gland a
physical or non-physical thing? If it is the former, then exactly how does a non-physical mind
‘act’ on it, and vice versa? Till date, this problem assails the staunchest protagonist of the view
of  Descartes.  Until  Descartes,  or  his  adherents  are  able  to  show  us  “how  a  non-spatial
(unextended)  substance,  which  cannot  thereby be  in  motion,  can  cause  the  motion  of  an
extended substance, or how motions in our bodies can cause changes in consciousness,”xxvii his
views will still be clouded in a penumbra of irreconcilable difficulties.
On  his  part,  Gilbert  Ryle,  writing  in  the  20th century,  gave  a  sustained  criticism of  the
Cartesian theory of interactionism. As a prelude to his own favored theory of mind which has
been  tagged  Logical  Behaviorism,  Ryle  took  it  as  a  necessary  condition,  the  task  of
dismantling the Cartesian epistemological  cum metaphysical edifice. According to Ryle, the
Cartesian theory of mind-body interaction, which he calls the official doctrine, is guilty of a
special charge, namely, the ‘Category Mistake.’ In submitting that the human mind is like a
‘ghost in a machine,’ Descartes, Ryle thinks, painted a fundamentally flawed picture of the
human person because he “represents the fact of mental life as if they belonged to one logical
type or category (or range of types or categories), when they actually belong to another.” xxviii
Hence:
It is perfectly proper to say, in one logical tone of voice that
there  exist  minds  and to  say…that  there  exist  bodies.  But
these  expressions  do  not  indicate  two  different  species  of
existence, for ‘existence’ is not a generic word like ‘colored’
or  ‘sexed.’  They  indicate  two  different  senses  of  ‘exist,’
somewhat as rising has different senses in ‘the tide is rising’,
‘hopes are rising’, and ‘the average age of death is rising.xxix
To Ryle, the mind is not to be construed in terms of an occult entity but,  rather, is to be
gleaned from the actual ‘behaviors’ of a person. “The cleverness of the clown”, Ryle states,
“may  be  exhibited  in  his  tripping  and  tumbling.”xxxAgainst  Ryle’s  criticism of  Cartesian
interactionism, Olatunji Oyeshile argues that, “it is… doubtful whether Ryle has succeeded in
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explaining the mind-body relationship as well as the ontological status of the mind.” xxxi The
doubt Oyeshile is speaking of here, derives from the fact that Ryle’s Behaviorist program of
mind, fails to square with the data of acting or mimicry and other ‘make believe’ behaviors.
Aside from Ryle’s criticism of  Cartesian interactionism above,  there  are  pockets  of  other
difficulties to note. For instance, some critics of Cartesian interactionism think its bifurcation
of  the human person into two parts  (mental  and physical)  violates Ockham’s principle of
parsimony according to which we are forbidden from the postulation of many entities when it
is  unnecessary  to  do  so.xxxii Also,  it  has  been  pointed  out  that  Cartesian  interactionsim
apparently violates the principle of conservation of energy. According to this view, energy
ought to be lost if indeed a bodily event produces (by way of an ‘interaction’) mental effects.
Since there has been no report of  any depletion in the amount of energy in the universe,
according to energy scientists, it must follow that no such interactions take place.xxxiii
Much worse for Descartes is  his presumption that  apodictic beliefs are derivable. Richard
Rortyxxxiv and  W.V.O.  Quine,xxxv amongothers,  dismiss  Descartes’  quest  for  an  infallible
epistemology  as  pseudo  quest,  for  it  ignores  the  facticity  of  man’s  fallibility.  Cartesian
interactionist thesis, a product of the ‘infallible notion of mind,’ seems to be an exercise in
futility. This is the case because:
It  fails  to  properly  investigate  the  essence  of  the  whole
foundationalist  programme  which  is  to  argue  against  the
fallibilists. Since man is fundamentally a fallible being, it can
be very difficult  to seek to establish that man can have an
infallible  idea  (say,  the  infallible  idea  off  an  apodictic
mind).xxxvi
Richard  Rorty,  writing  in  his  hugely  influential  work,  Philosophy  and  the  Mirror  of
Nature(1979) also rejected Descartes’ theory of mind-body interaction. According to him, “…
the conception of the ‘mind’ as a separate substance in which mental processes are located, far
from being a concept based on direct experience, is an ‘invention’ of Descartes, which has
misled philosophers since his time.”xxxvii In ‘deconstructing’ Cartesian interactionism, Rorty
postulates  a  hypothetical  world,  “antipodea” whose inhabitants  have no concept  of  mind.
These antipodeans, according to Rorty, express their mentalistic feelings by referring, instead,
to the neural states of their brains and central nervous system (CNS). xxxviii Of course, I am not
unaware of the many criticisms that have been leveled against Rorty’s ideas here. But what is
worth stressing,  with respect  to our purposes in this essay, is  that  Rorty rejects Cartesian
psycho-physical dualism and also clearly favors the scientific worldview of personhood.
The ‘problem of other minds’, or solipsism, is another criticism that has been leveled
against  Cartesian  interactionsim.  According  to  advocatesof  this  criticism,  one  immediate
consequence of Descartes’ theory is that one can only have knowledge of oneself or self-
enclosed world, while the external world and other people (or minds) being currently figments
of imagination. If Descartes’ position is rightly interpreted as solipsism, then the question that
necessarily emanates from this is: Do not other persons also exist in the sense Descartes exist?
If they do exist, then it follows that they too, like Descartes, have minds. If this is the case,
then a more insuperable question that  inevitably arises from this answer is:  What are the
possibilities of our having knowledge of other minds in the same way in which we also have
knowledge of our own mind? This ‘problem of other minds’ that Cartesian interactionism
engenders is not merely about whether other persons have minds but, more technically, about
52
                            GNOSI: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Human Theory and Praxis, Vol. 1(2) (2018)
(DOI: https://doi.org/10.5281/10.5281/zenodo.3463785)
how we know that they do have minds. As broached by J.L. Austin, “I may say I believe other
minds exist but that does not mean that I know them all. (This is because) in philosophical
discourse the existence of your alleged beliefs is not challenged, but the existence of your
alleged knowledge is challenged.”xxxix It is important to note that neither René Descartes nor
his protagonists have been able to put forward adequate answers to these difficulties. Their
various theories, for example the Analogical, Linguistic and Intuitive theories are all riddled
with  theoretical  difficulties  and  as  a  result  have  made  this  problem,  till  date,  seemingly
unassailable.xl
One last criticism of Descartes’ theory of mind-body interaction that is worthy of note
has  been  raised  by  Gabriel  Vacariu.  Vacariu  thinks  that  “even  if  most  people  consider,
ontologically, the mind as a physical entity, many of them do not admit the epistemological
reduction  of  the  mind to  the  brain.”xli He  argues  that  the  ‘error’ of  these  (‘reductionist’)
researchers derive from their belief in a mono-ontological world (or ‘unicorn’ world, as he
calls it) when the reality is actually that of a ‘multiverse’ ontological world. In this erroneous
belief in the subsistence of a ‘unicorn’ world, argues Vacariu, is both Descartes and (his chief
opponents)  cognitive  neuroscientists.  On  the  basis  of  Vacariu’s sweeping rejection  of  the
views of modern science, as well as Cartesian interactionism, he advances the view that the
phenomena of ‘mind’ and ‘body’ (or brain) belong to ‘Epistemologically Different Worlds’
(EDWs). From the EDWs’ perspective, states Vacariu, the phenomena of mind and brain exist
separately and canonly be apprehended (or known) in different terms. The one is, internal and
can only be  had through ‘representation,’ whereas  the  other  can be  observed through the
perceptual or laboratory mechanisms of positron emission tomography (PET), and functional
magnetic resonance imaging (FMRI). Given this reality, therefore:
It  is  not  possible  to  locate  epistemologically  different
ontological substances within the same world (as Descartes
wanted).  In  this  case,  the  position  of  elements  must  be
preserved: new conditions of observation require new entities
within the  new worlds,  but  what  kind of  worlds? It  is  not
about ontological, many, multiverse or possible worlds, but
about “epistemological different worlds” (EDWs).xlii
To  this  philosopher,  therefore,  the  mind-body  problem,  an  ‘error’  from  Cartesian
interactionism,  is  a  pseudo-problem.  So,  is  cognitive  neuroscience  (including  psychology,
psychiatry, and so on), as well as all versions of identity/materialistic theories (for example,
Central  State  Materialism,  Logical  Behaviorism,  Brain  Process  materialism,  and  so  on).
Mental  states  could only  correspond to  entities  that  belong to  other  EDWs;  they are  not
identical, produced or supervene on states of other hyperontological status. With the EDWs
perspective,  we  have  to  move  from  ontological  and/or  epistemological  frameworks  in
analyzing  different  classes  of  entities  to  a  hyperontological  framework.  Thus,  the  EDWs
perspective  rejects  the  Cartesian  dualism,  the  identity  theory  and  all  the  nonreductionist
approaches.xliiiOther  traditional  theories  that  can  also  be  pitched  against  Cartesian
interactionismand  its  cognates  includes:  ‘Psycho-physical  Parallelism,’xliv‘Panpyschism’xlv
‘Actualism  (phenomenism),’xlvi‘Agnosticism’xlvii‘Epiphenomenalism’,‘Occasionalism’  and
‘Pre-established Harmony.’  We will not discuss these positions in detail in this paper. Our
justification for this deliberate desert is because, they all suffer, more or less, from the same
defects that Descartes’ own theory had– especially from the point of view of physicalism.
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PARAPSYCHOLOGY,  NEUROSCIENCE  AND  CARTESIAN  INTERACTIONIST
THEORY OF MIND.
Parapsychology is the scientific investigation of paranormal and psychic phenomena
including  telepathy,  clairvoyance,  near-death  experiences,  precognition,  psychokinesis,
reincarnation,  synchronicity,  apparitional  experiences  and  other  paranormal
claims.xlviiiPhilosophers  of  mind,  or  parapsychologists,  researchers  in  the  allied  fields  of
neuroscience (scientific study of the nervous system) and artificial intelligence (AI), since the
last century (and especially the present) have been able to put forward luminous statements of
research whose theoretical coherence and experimental qualities now threaten the views of
people like Descartes and other so-called ‘religious philosophers (of mind).’ In this circle of
influence are personages like Gilbert Ryle and his theory of ‘Logical Behaviorism’ (that we
earlier  considered);  J.J.C.  Smart  and  U.T.  Place  and  their  theory  of  ‘Brain  Process
Materialism,xlixand  David  M.  Armstrong’s  ‘Central  State  Materialism.’ Others  are  Jerome
Schaffer, Keith Campbell, Herbert Feigl, as well as Alan Turing and F.H. George in the field
of  artificial  intelligence  (AI).Interestingly,  some  of  these  recent  trends,  through  their
theoretical coherence and experimental qualities seem to advance a physicalist outlook to the
mind-body problem. Physicalism, simply put, is the position that everything is physical. It is a
thesis about the nature of reality. Contemporary philosophers, sometimes refer to physicalism,
as expressing the thesis that everything supervenes on, or is necessitated by, the physical. l This
could mean that everything, no matter how it appears to us, will ultimately be accounted for
physically. In philosophy of mind, ‘Identity theory of mind’ represents a very strong version
of a physicalist account of the mind. According to J.J.C. Smart, the identity theory of mind
holds that states and processes of the mind are identical to states and processes of the brain.
Strictly speaking, it need not hold that the mind is identical to the brain.li
As espoused by U.T. Place, Herbert Feigl and J.J.C. Smart, the identity theory of the
mind, is sometimes referred to as, brain process materialism, because these philosophers, hold
that  sensations are identical  with brain processes.  The theory, denies the existence of any
irreducible  non-physical  property  of  the  mind.  U.T.  Place,  in  his  Magnum  opus,  “Is
Consciousness A Brain Process?”argues that the thesis ‘consciousness, is identifiable with
certain processes in the brain’, and is a reasonable scientific hypothesis. Place, suggested, that
we can identify consciousness with a given pattern of brain activity.liiThree years after Place’
article, J.J.C. Smart published an article titled, Sensations and Brain Processes. In this article,
Smart,  defends  Place’  position  and  hopes  to  put  the  argument  that,  ‘consciousness  is
identifiable with brain process’, in a more nearly unobjectionable form. His basic claim in the
article is that, “in so far as a sensation statement is a report of something, that something is in
fact a brain process, sensations are nothing over and above brain processes.” liii
The identity theory (Central-State Materialism), as fleshed out by David Armstrong in
his “A Materialist Theory of the Mind”, maintains that mental states, beliefs and desires, are
identical with the states of the central nervous system. Armstrong further argues that, if the
mind is thought of as ‘that, which has mental states,’ then we can, on this theory (of central-
state materialism) say, that the mind is simply, the central nervous system, or less accurately
but more epigrammatically, the mind is simply the brain.liv Mental states here are identifiable
with physico-chemical states of the central nervous system. Suffice it to say here that all these
permutations  are  direct  responses  to  the  undoing  of  previous  dualistic  (i.e  Platonic  and
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Cartesian) attempts to factor out a dependable corpus in the herculean task of unearthing the
ontology of human person.
CONCLUSION
We set out in this paper to discuss the Cartesian approach and contributions to the
mind-body problem. In discussing this, the paper critically examined the central arguments of
Cartesian  interactionism  and  carefully  highlighted  some  criticisms  besetting  Descartes’
approach. The paper also identified some recent trends in parapsychology and neuroscientific
research to stifle the Cartesian project. Admittedly, a relationship among self, mind and body
in humans is still  not clearly known in philosophy and science because of the absence of
germane human data that adequately facilitates an objective explanation. Teachings connected
to  their  relationship  in  religions  have  been  given  in  general  and  subjective  terms.
Consequently, philosophers and scientists  have been investigating to  find objective proofs
related to their relationship.lv Recent findings in neuroscience, by their physicalist approach,
seem to  construe  the  mind-body  problem as  a  pseudo-problem.  But,  their  monistic  and
materialistic account of human person fails to square with the data of phenomena like pre-
cognition (in dreams, for example), out of body experiences, near death experiences, telepathy
and  many  other  concerns.  Given  their  inadequacies,  Descartes  ought  to  be  credited  for
articulating foundational knowledge on the ontological status of the mind and its functional
attributes. Beyond this, neither Descartes nor his detractors can be said to have adequately
succeeded in offering an objectively reliable account of the human person. Thus, the project of
personhood or the discourse on human nature remains a perennial philosophical mission.
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